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Abstract
Human communication relies on shared expectations between speakers and hearers. For example, upon
hearing a sentence like “Some of my dogs bark,” the listener typically assumes that the speaker did not intend
the literal semantic meaning (“At least one (and possibly all) of my dogs bark”). Instead, s/he is likely to derive
a scalar implicature (SI), inferring that the speaker intended to convey “Not all of my dogs bark.” Properties of
the speaker are known to affect whether listeners compute SIs, with comprehenders being less likely to make a
pragmatic inference when the speaker is not knowledgeable of the situation at hand. What is unclear is
whether listeners also use previously-held expectations about speaker groups (e.g., children, non-native
speakers) to override Gricean principles, in such a way that is stable across situational contexts and does not
require an adaptation period. Across two experiments, we investigated how listeners interpret under-
informative utterances produced by native and non-native speakers. We found that a subset of individuals is
more tolerant to pragmatic infelicities produced by non-native speakers (Exp. 2), but that this tolerance is
subject to individual differences in language processing ability and does not emerge in a speeded task where
the utterances are supported by visual context (Exp. 1).
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1  Introduction 
Human communication relies on shared expectations between speakers and hearers (Kuperberg and 
Jaeger 2016). One source of such expectations is the Cooperative Principle (CP), which consists of 
a set of maxims that state that interlocutors form their utterances such that they are as true (Maxim 
of Quality), informative (Maxim of Quantity), relevant (Maxim of Relevance), and clear (Maxim of 
Manner) as possible (Grice 1975). Because people expect speakers to follow these maxims, they 
will often pragmatically enrich the literal semantic meaning of an utterance that appears to be in 
violation of the CP, making an inference about what the speaker intended. For example, a sentence 
like “Some of my dogs bark” appears to violate the Maxim of Quantity: it is under-informative, 
because the speaker used the weaker term in a logical scale (some) when s/he could have used the 
stronger, more informative term (all).  When comprehending this utterance, the listener typically 
assumes that the speaker did not intend the literal semantic meaning (“At least one (and possibly all) 
of my dogs bark”). Instead, the listener is likely to derive a scalar implicature (SI), inferring that the 
speaker intended to convey “Not all of my dogs bark.”  
Properties of the speaker are known to affect whether listeners compute SIs. For instance, indi-
viduals are less likely to derive an implicature from under-informative ‘some’ statements if they are 
led to believe, through prior linguistic context, that the speaker is not knowledgeable of the situation 
at hand (Bergen and Grodner 2012). For example, if a speaker were to say “At my client’s request, 
I skimmed the investment reports” followed by “Some of the real estate investments lost money,” 
the listener would be less likely to infer that “not all of the real estate investments lost money” for 
that speaker as compared to a speaker who meticulously compiled the reports. There is also some 
evidence that listeners can adapt to speaker-specific use of some and many to refer to various quan-
tities of objects (Yildirim et al. 2015). For instance, three may be “some” for a particular individual, 
but another speaker may use “some” only for five or more objects. Critically, both of these examples 
involve listeners adjusting to a single speaker in some sort of adaptation period (reading context 
sentences or completing training trials). What is unclear is whether listeners also form expectations 
about speaker meaning based on speaker group identity (e.g., age, native language), in such a way 
that is stable across situational contexts and does not require an adaptation period. This would re-
quire overriding strong Gricean expectations on a regular basis, or having different sets of expecta-
tions for various groups of speakers. On the other hand, it may be the case that the expectations in 
the CP are only temporarily suspended in cases where the specific context at hand requires it.  
We make the first investigation into speaker-group expectations in SI computation by compar-
ing under-informative utterances spoken by native speakers to those spoken by non-native speakers, 
who may be assumed to be less pragmatically competent. We take our inspiration from research 
demonstrating that foreign-accented speech affects neural responses to syntactic violations, with 
P600 responses attenuated in response to violations produced by a non-native speaker (Hanulikova 
et al. 2012). If the prior expectations that guide syntactic processing also extend to higher-order 
language processing, under-informativeness may be accepted to a greater extent (with SIs possibly 
being derived less frequently) for non-native speakers. While the comprehender knows that there 
are better, more felicitous, ways of conveying the technically true information in the sentence, they 
may also assume that a non-native speaker is not fully aware of this. In Experiment 1, we investigate 
how the accent of a speaker affects SI computation, and in Experiment 2 we ask whether non-native 
speech alters the final interpretation of an under-informative utterance. 
2  Experiment 1: Picture-Sentence Verification Task 
In Experiment 1, we investigate how native speakers of English interpret pragmatically infelicitous 
sentences spoken by a native speaker of English and a native speaker of Mandarin Chinese using a 
picture-sentence verification task. Participants must respond as quickly as possible to whether a 
spoken description matches a previously presented image (e.g., “Some of these circles are green” 
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— an array of five green and three gray circles). Reaction times are measured. If listeners adjust 
their expectations to a speaker’s identity and expect non-native speakers to produce pragmatically 
infelicitous descriptions (e.g., “Some of these circles are green” — an array of eight green circles), 
participants should respond that an infelicitous sentence is a bad description more slowly when it is 
spoken by a non-native speaker than when it is spoken by a native speaker.  
2.1  Method 
2.1.1  Participants 
Fifty-two English monolinguals aged 18-20 (M = 18.56, SD = .712) participated in Experiment 1 
for course credit. All were undergraduates at the University of Delaware. 
2.1.2  Materials 
One hundred sixty arrays of objects were created for Experiment 1. Each array featured eight simple 
objects arranged in two horizontal lines (circles, squares, stars, triangles, hearts, diamonds, crosses, 
or moons). In half of the pictures, every object had the same fill (red, orange, yellow, green, blue, 
purple, gray, black, striped, or checkered). In the other half, three of the eight objects were gray.  
Eighty sentences were created to describe the arrays, each following the pattern “Some of these 
[shape]s are [fill]” or “All of these [shape]s are [fill].” Each sentence was recorded twice: once by 
a female native speaker of English (Native Speaker condition), and once by a female native speaker 
of Mandarin Chinese (Non-Native Speaker condition). Sentences and pictures were paired such that 
four Sentence Types were created: Infelicitous, Felicitous, False, True. Conditions are shown in 
Figure 1, below. 
 
 
Figure 1: Sentence Types used in Experiment 1.  
2.1.3  Procedure 
Participants were tested individually or in pairs in a quiet room with the experimenter present. Each 
participant heard 160 sentences, 40 of each Sentence Type. Trials were presented in two blocks, one 
for each Speaker Type (counterbalanced across participants, stimuli fully rotated). Each trial began 
with a fixation for 500 milliseconds, followed by an array of objects for 500 milliseconds. After 
each array, a noise mask appeared for 200 milliseconds, and then a sentence played, accompanied 
by a fixation cross on the screen. The noise mask served to prevent an afterimage appearing when 
the participant was listening to the sentence. After the sentence, participants saw a screen with the 
words GOOD and BAD, and were asked to press a key as quickly as possible indicating whether 
the sentence was a good description of the picture, or a bad description. The next trial was presented 
after the participant made a response. If no response was detected within 3000 milliseconds, the 
experiment moved on to the next trial. Participants were given a break after the first block. The task 
was administered using Open Sesame presentation software (Mathôt et al. 2012). 
The expected response for False trials was BAD, the expected response for True trials was 
GOOD, and the expected response for Felicitous trials was GOOD. If participants compute a scalar 
implicature, they should respond BAD to Infelicitous trials (e.g., all of the circles are red, not only 
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some). If, however, they take the logical interpretation they should respond GOOD to these trials 
(e.g., some of the circles are red, in fact they all are). If a speaker’s accent affects online expectations 
about pragmatic felicity, participants should be faster to respond BAD to Infelicitous trials in the 
Native Speaker condition. Alternatively, if speaker identity does not affect the speed with which 
participants respond to Infelicitous trials may not differ across Speaker Types. 
2.2  Results and Discussion 
A repeated-measures ANOVA on the proportion of GOOD responses was performed with Sentence 
Type (Infelicitous, Felicitous, False, True) and Speaker Type (Native Speaker, Non-Native Speaker) 
as within-subjects factors. The main effect of Sentence Type was significant, F(3, 153) = 325.374, 
p < .001, but neither the main effect of Speaker Type nor the interaction reached significance. Fol-
low-up tests (Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons) revealed that False trials (M = .04, SD 
= .05) had a significantly lower proportion of GOOD responses than True (M = .96, SD = .06), 
Infelicitous (M = .33, SD = .08), and Felicitous (M = .90, SD = .08) trials (all p’s < .001). True and 
Felicitous trials, which did not differ (p > .1), had a significantly higher proportion of GOOD re-
sponses than Infelicitous trials (both p’s < .001).  
 
 
Figure 2: Reaction times for Experiment 1. Error bars represent +/- 1 S.E.M. 
A complementary repeated-measures ANOVA on reaction times was then performed. Only 
“correct” responses were analyzed (Infelicitous — BAD, Felicitous — GOOD, False — BAD, True 
— GOOD). Although in the critical Infelicitous condition, there is no objectively correct answer, 
we analyzed BAD responses because we were interested in the speech of SI computation. Because 
14 participants were logical interpreters who nearly always responded GOOD to Infelicitous trials, 
these individuals could not be included in the analysis, bringing our total number of participants to 
38. Responses that exceeded 2500 milliseconds or 2.5 standard deviations above a participant’s 
average response time were excluded. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Sentence Type, F(3, 
111) = 5.774, p = .001, but neither the main effect of Speaker Type nor the interaction reached 
significance. Post-hoc tests indicated that Felicitous (M = 403.54, SD = 120.91) and Infelicitous (M 
= 390.31, SD = 103.52) trials were responded to more slowly than True (M = 364.91, SD = 86.23) 
trials (p < .001 and p = .035, respectively. False trials (M = 380.99, SD = 101.02) did not differ from 
Felicitous, Infelicitous, or True trials. No other comparisons were significant. Results are depicted 
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in Figure 2. 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that a speaker’s accent has no effect on the speed at which 
SIs are computed; reaction times for the critical Infelicitous condition did not differ by Speaker 
Type. Nevertheless, participants may have been engaged in another type of strategy during the task. 
Based on previous research (Bott and Noveck 2004), one would expect slower response times to the 
Infelicitous condition overall, reflecting the cost of computing a SI. Because reaction times reflect 
an aggregate of cognitive processes that occur in response to a particular stimulus, a purer test of 
speaker identity is to use a more time-sensitive measure like ERPs. Moreover, listeners may indeed 
form different expectations about pragmatic felicity based on native speaker status, but these expec-
tations may not be integrated during the earliest moments of processing, and in a situation with 
visual context present. Because the task demands of Experiment 1 (timing, visual context) provided 
an extremely strict test of pragmatic expectations, we conducted Experiment 2 to determine whether 
listeners might adjust their offline interpretations of pragmatically infelicitous sentences depending 
on the speaker. 
3  Experiment 2: Sentence Rating Task 
In Experiment 2, we ask whether offline ratings of pragmatically infelicitous sentences (“Some gi-
raffes have long necks”) differ depending on whether the speaker is a native or a non-native speaker 
of English. If listeners expect non-native speakers to be more likely to produce infelicitous state-
ments (in a situation devoid of visual context), they should rate these infelicitous sentences as more 
acceptable in the non-native speaker condition as compared to the native speaker condition. As a 
secondary goal, we sought to understand how individual characteristics of the listener might affect 
the extent to which they adjust to non-native speech. To address this issue, participants also com-
pleted measures of social-communicative ability (known to affect SI computation; Nieuwland et al. 
2010) and language processing ability (known to affect non-native speech comprehension; Lev-Ari 
et al. 2016).  
3.1  Method 
3.1.1  Participants 
Sixty English monolinguals aged 18-21 (M = 18.57, SD = .81) participated in Experiment 2 for 
course credit. All were undergraduate students at the University of Delaware. 
3.1.2  Materials 
Eighty sentences were created for the Sentence Ratings task. Sentences were evenly distributed 
across four conditions: False (“All women are doctors who went to medical school”), True (“All 
snow is cold and can melt into water”), Felicitous (“Some people have dogs as pets in the house”), 
and Infelicitous (“Some people have noses with two nostrils”). For the critical Infelicitous condition, 
sentences were created such that they were technically true but pragmatically infelicitous if one 
computes a SI. The other three conditions were either straightforwardly true (True, Felicitous) or 
false (False). Sentences in all four conditions were based on general knowledge subject matter, such 
that the truth value of the utterance is easily discernable by the typical college student. The four 
conditions did not differ from one another in sentence length in words or sentence length in syllables 
(all p’s > .1). Each sentence was recorded twice: once by a female native speaker of English (Native 
Speaker condition) and once by a female native speaker of Mandarin Chinese (Non-Native Speaker 
condition). Recordings were made such that emphasis was not placed on any particular word. 
The Communicative Subscale of the Autism-Quotient Questionnaire (AQ-COMM; Baron-Co-
hen Wheelwright Skinner Martin and Clubley 2001) was administered to all participants. It consists 
of 10 statements designed to probe social communication skills, such as “I am often the last to 
understand the point of a joke” and “I know how to tell if someone listening to me is getting bored.” 
For each statement, participants indicate how true it is of themselves. The standard scoring method 
was used, calculating a total score out of 10 of the number of autistic traits the person possesses.  
Participants also completed a Lexical Decision task as a measure of English comprehension 
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ability. Performance on this task has been correlated with various measures of language processing 
ability (Harrington 2006). Twenty English words (e.g., EDUCATION) and twenty pseudowords 
(e.g., EMUCATION) were presented in a random order for 500 milliseconds each. Participants were 
asked to indicate by keypress, as quickly as possible, whether or not each stimulus was a real English 
word. Both accuracy and reaction times were collected. For the analysis of reaction times, incorrect 
responses and responses slower than 3000 milliseconds were excluded.  
3.1.3  Procedure 
Participants were tested individually or in pairs in a quiet room with the experimenter present. The 
experimental session lasted 30 minutes, and consisted of the main Sentence Rating task followed by 
a Language History questionnaire to confirm that all participants were native speakers, the AQ-
COMM, and the Lexical Decision task.  
In the sentence rating task, participants listened to all 80 sentences divided into two blocks of 
40 sentences each. In one block, participants heard sentences in the Native Speaker condition, and 
in another block, participants heard sentences in the Non-Native Speaker condition. Blocks were 
counterbalanced across participants and the sentences were fully rotated through Speaker Type. 
Sentences were presented in a random order in each block. On each trial, the sentence was presented 
auditorily through headphones. Then, participants were instructed to rate how “Good” or “Bad” the 
sentence was on a 5-point scale (1 = very bad, 5 = very good). Participants were asked to rate the 
sentences based on whether or not they made sense. After rating the sentence, participants pressed 
a button to move on to the next sentence. There was no time limit; participants could take as long 
as they needed to make a response. The sentence rating task and both questionnaires were adminis-
tered using Qualtrics survey software. The Lexical Decision task was administered from the PEBL 
test battery (Mueller and Piper 2014). 
3.2  Results and Discussion 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on the sentence ratings with Sentence Type (Infelic-
itous, Felicitous, True, False) and Speaker Type (Native, Non-Native) as within-subjects factors. 
The main effect of Sentence Type was significant, F(3, 177) = 163.137, p < .001. Post-hoc tests 
(Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparison) revealed that False sentences (M = 2.13, SD = .99) 
were rated lower than True (M = 3.95, SD = .64), Felicitous (M = 4.11, SD = .62) and Infelicitous 
(M = 2.59, SD = .99) sentences (all p’s < .001). Infelicitous sentences were rated lower than True 
and Felicitous sentences (both p’s < .001). True and Felicitous sentence ratings did not differ sig-
nificantly from one another (p > .05). The main effect of Speaker was also significant, F(1, 59) = 
5.641, p = .021, such that Non-Native sentences (M = 3.14, SD = 1.12) were rated lower than Native 
sentences (M = 3.25, SD = 1.21), p = .009.  The interaction between Sentence Type and Speaker did 
not reach significance. Thus, a foreign accent affected sentence ratings overall, not specifically the 
interpretation of pragmatically Infelicitous statements.  
Despite the lack of Speaker Type effect, visual inspection of the data revealed a great deal of 
variation in the extent to which participants rated sentences in the two Speaker Types as similar or 
different, even in the True, False, and Felicitous conditions which should yield similar ratings. Thus, 
an Accent Tolerance score was calculated by subtracting the average rating for Non-Native speech 
in the True, False, and Felicitous conditions from the average rating for Native speech in the same 
three conditions. Then, a median split was performed on the participants based on this rating. This 
resulted in an Accent Tolerant group who rated the two speakers as relatively similar and an Accent 
Intolerant group who rated the Native and Non-Native Speakers more differently in the unambigu-
ous True, False, and Felicitous conditions. 
Two repeated-measures ANOVAs were then performed separately for Accent Tolerant individ-
uals (N = 30) and Accent Intolerant individuals (N = 30). The ANOVA for the Accent Intolerant 
participants revealed a main effect of Sentence Type, F(3, 87) = 82.943, p < .001, as well as a main 
effect of Speaker Type, F(1, 29) = 43.070, p  < .001, with no significant interaction between the two. 
Specifically, post-hoc tests showed that False sentences were rated significantly lower than True (p 
< .001), Felicitous (p < .001), and Infelicitous (p = .010) sentences. Infelicitous sentences were rated 
significantly lower than both True and Felicitous sentences (both p’s < .001), which did not differ 
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from one another (p > .1). Additionally, Non-Native speech was rated significantly lower than Na-
tive speech (p < .001).  
The ANOVA for the Accent Tolerant individuals also revealed a main effect of Sentence Type, 
F(3, 87) = 83.336, p < .001, and a main effect of Speaker Type, F(1, 29) = 13.295, p  = .001, as well 
as a significant interaction between the two, F(3, 87) = 4.107, p = .009. False sentences were rated 
significantly lower than True, Felicitous, and Infelicitous sentences (all p’s < .001). Infelicitous 
sentences were rated lower than True and Felicitous sentences (both p’s < .001), which did not differ 
from one another (p > .1). In contrast to Accent Intolerant participants, Non-Native speech was rated 
higher than Native speech (p = .001). Post-hoc analyses showed that specifically, Infelicitous sen-
tences (but not any other type) were rated significantly higher in the Non-Native Speaker condition 
as compared to the Native Speaker condition (p = .002). Thus, the Accent Tolerant group was se-




Figure 3: Results of Experiment 2, broken down by Accent Tolerant and Accent Intolerant partici-
pant groups. Error bars represent +/- 1 S.E.M. 
 
To understand why the Accent Tolerant group showed a selective pragmatic tolerance but the 
Accent Intolerant group rated Non-Native speech lower overall, we turned to our measures of social-
communicative ability and language processing ability. We performed two One-way ANOVAs with 
AQ-COMM score and Lexical Decision Task reaction times as the dependent variables, and Group 
(Accent Tolerant, Accent Intolerant) as the independent variable. The groups did not differ signifi-
cantly in terms of AQ-COMM score, F(1, 58) = .006, p = .938, but the Accent Tolerant group had 
significantly faster Lexical Decision Task reaction times (M = 730.8, SD = 147.7) than the Accent 
Intolerant group (M = 830.8, SD = 208.0) , F(1, 58) = 5.374, p = .024. Thus, the Accent Intolerant 
participants with poorer language processing ability may have had more difficulty understanding 
the foreign-accented speech, therefore rating it lower overall. Figure 3 depicts the results of both 
groups.  
In summary, some comprehenders have different expectations about use of nuanced pragmatic 
means of conveying information based on the group that the speaker belongs to (native vs. non-
native, in this case). Pragmatically infelicitous sentences are deemed to be more acceptable when 
they are produced by a non-native speaker as compared to a native speaker. Critically, this pragmatic 
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tolerance is subject to individual differences in language processing ability, with less skilled com-
prehenders judging non-native speech as worse overall. Additionally, the increased tolerance to-
wards non-native speakers does not appear to come online in the earliest moments of processing (at 
least in a case where there is visual context), but does affect untimed, offline ratings.  
4  General Discussion 
After being given additional context and/or a training period, listeners adjust to individual speakers 
when computing scalar implicatures and interpreting the meaning of quantifiers. In the present study, 
we asked whether listeners also adjust their pragmatic processing due to expectations about different 
groups of speakers (without an adaptation period). Specifically, we focused on interpretation of 
foreign-accented non-native speech. A hypothesis one could make is that because listeners adjust to 
characteristics of an individual speaker, they also adjust to characteristics of a group of speakers and 
are more likely to expect a non-native speaker to produce an under-informative utterance (and are 
therefore less likely to compute a SI). On the other hand, one might argue that listeners very strongly 
abide by the CP, and only shift their behavior when it is necessary, e.g., when they are given reason 
to believe that a single speaker will produce an under-informative utterance when describing a single 
context. 
Across two experiments, we found that linguistically skilled listeners judge infelicitous sen-
tences to be more acceptable when they are produced by a non-native speaker, but this adjustment 
did not appear for less linguistically skilled participants, or in an experimental paradigm that re-
quired speeded judgments and included visual context. It seems, then, that listeners can be sensitive 
to the language background of the speaker when engaging in pragmatic processing, but this sensi-
tivity is highly subject to individual differences and task demands. The selective pragmatic tolerance 
we observed may be relatively weak because it requires overriding the maxims of the CP, which are 
a set of expectations we as communicators hold very strongly.  
Because this is the first investigation into speaker identity effects at the group level for SI com-
putation, there are still several alternative explanations of our findings left open. First, listeners may 
never use speaker group identity information in the earliest moments of SI computation, but may 
re-analyze a sentence and change their initial interpretation if necessary. Alternatively, listeners may 
be influenced by information about a speaker’s language background early during sentence pro-
cessing, but not in cases that include supporting visual context. Both of these potential explanations 
may be subject to individual differences in language processing ability or other listener characteris-
tics. Furthermore, more research is needed in determine exactly what expectations listeners hold 
about non-native speakers (e.g., linguistic competence, world knowledge, cultural stereotypes), and 
how these expectations influence pragmatic inference.  
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